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Content 
 
• Modelling approaches of safety – critical systems 
• Advantages of dynamic modelling using a discrete event 
simulation environment 
• Overview and examples of the projects that have used this 
approach to derive risk and reliability assessments.  
• Conclusion 
 
SPs Riskseminar, Lund 2 
25. November 2014 DTU Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark 
    
     
   
Modelling approach practised in risk analysis 
 
Example power backup system 
• Fault tree 
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generator fails
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Loss of power 
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P=1.199E-5
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• Fault tree 
• Event tree 
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Modelling approach practised in risk analysis 
 
Example power backup system 
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• Fault tree 
• Event tree 
• Barrier diagram 
 
 
Modelling approach practised in risk analysis 
 
Example power backup system 
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• Fault tree 
• Event tree 
• Barrier diagram 
• Dynamic using Discrete Event Simulation (DES, Arena® vers. 14.50.0) 
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Power backup system
Modelling approach practised in risk analysis 
 
Example power backup system 
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Point of departure in accident modelling 
 
Consider a natural gas pipeline rupture and the prediction of the 
consecutive failure of supply to a customer: 
 
 
P(Supply failure) = P(Supply failure | Pipeline rupture) x P(Pipeline rupture) 
 
• Rupture event easily predicted by e.g. Fault tree  
 
• the consecutive supply failure is not easily predicted by FT, as function 
includes: 
– Amount of gas (pressure) in the pipeline segment downstream,   
– Number of customers 
– Hourly gas consumption as a function of seasonal and production variations. 
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Approach of our choice: Discrete Event Simulation 
1. Models mimick/imitate procecesses and events 
2. No highly abstract theories  
3. Domain experts understand models and influence their 
development 
4. Animation and graphical scenarios contribute to understanding 
and confidence 
5. Individual (hazardous) scenarios can be played back 
6. Easy integration of the technical part and human performance 
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DES models for risk analysis 
1. Models are dynamic (vs. static conventional models) 
2. Data are sampled statistically (Monte Carlo approach),  
– e.g. hole size, wind speed, release direction, number of persons 
working, seasonal – daily changes 
– Loss of partial performance and its degradation in time´ 
– Dynamic demand (e.g. gas supply): seasonal - daily changes  
3. Condition dependent down times 
4. Gradual recovery after a failure, etc. 
5. Multiple runs (many!) are performed to extract risk numbers  for 
assessing Individual Risk, Potential Loss of Life, Group Risk) 
– Simulation runs are more time consuming 
 
Easy account for dynamic stochastic dimensions in systems  
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Reference projects 
1. OPHRA –Offshore Platform Hydrocarbon Risk Analysis. Financed by 
Dong Energy 
2. Simulation of human performance in time-pressured scenarios (Case: 
Performance of operators in a control room of a NPP under MLOCA 
scenario). Performed under the Halden Reactor Project 
3. Reliability of a gas supply. Financed by Swedegas, owner and operator 
the gas pipeline Dragør, DK – Gutherborg, SV 
4. Safe manning of merchant ships. Financed by the Danish Maritime Fond 
5. Train driver performance modelling (developing engineering models for 
usability studies). The Halden Project 
6. Operational risk of assets for a Water Utility Company, Master project 
supported by Københavns Energi and Reliasset A/S 
7. Risk analysis of a generic hydrogen refuelling station. Master project 
8. Optimizing the rating of offshore and onshore transformers for an 
offshore wind farm. Master project supported by DONG 
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THE HYDROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEM  
• A Hydrogen refuelling station: 
– Hydrogen supply by pipeline or road 
tanker 
– Storage facilities (main tank, compressor 
and buffer storage) 
– Dispensers to refuel car and busses 
– Cash desk 
The network consists of a number of stations, the production is decentral 
and supply is by pipeline or truck delivery.  
Goal: Uninterrupted Hydrogen delivery has to be achieved in all cases, 
while a minimum of hydrogen is stored on-site to reduce the risk 
potential 
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Example: Modelling of truck unloading 
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Truck Unloading event failure: 
• truck has defects on arrival 
• Defects in unloading hose 
• Incorrect coupling 
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The water supply system in the area around 
Copenhagen  
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OPHRA - Feasibility study supported by 
DONG energy 
• Only releases in center of process area 
• Only gas releases 
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Conventional approach 
 
 
 
 
Physical phenomena 
Detection & response 
Escape & evacuation 
Impact & consequence 
1. Causal diagrams (fault and event trees) 
2. Diagrams have to capture all possible 
developments of accident scenarios 
3. The scenarios involve several agents and 
actions that behave “independently” and 
each has its own timeline 
4. Capturing all this in a single diagram 
leads to complex logic and requires 
simplification  
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Application of dynamic & dependent models 
 
Physical 
phenomena 
Detection & 
response 
Escape & 
evacuation 
Impact & 
consequence 
Time 
• The event sequences trigger each other and are simulated concurrently. 
•  Events taking place in one sequence change the conditions in the other 
sequences (dynamic interaction) 
16 
Alternative: 
model each process separately but allow feed-back and interaction between processes 
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The off-shore platform 
12 m 
12m 
2m 
3m  
3 m 
17 
ALARM 
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DES model logic 
18 
Create crew working
workers died
initialisation rescued workersASET _ RSETRSE T
working place counting_rescued_workers
counting_fatalities
0      
0      
0      
0      
     0
1) input parameters, 2) Consequences, 3) Evacuation 
Number jet firesimmediate_ignition
parameters
ignition VBA
explosions
Number gasVBA
parameter
write jetflame
ignition
write delayedalarm_gas
alarm_flame
VBA table
write dispersioinVBA
calc_ASET
calc__ASET
0      
0      
     0
0      
events
Create release
Hole Parameters VBA Detector checkdelay accidentparameters
initialize
0      
1) 
2) 
3) 
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Example results: 
19 
10000 simulation runs 
Input:  average st.dev. min max 
wind speed (m/s) 11 5 5 20 
wind direction (degrees) 91 52 0 180 
hole size statistic (mm) 12 28 1 200 
No. workers at random positions 4   3 5 
Output:         
wind speed in module (m/s) 0.6 0.3 0.1 1.4 
mass flow (kg/s) 6.2 27.8 0.007 271.5 
SEPmax jet flame (kW/s) 40 11 28 93 
RSET (s) 240 176 301 
ASET (s) 427 0 >600 
No. fatilities per accident 1.3 1.8 0 5 
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A task network model of human activities 
for improving usability and safety 
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Domain: train driver 
• Motivation: relatively high number of SPADS (Signals Passed At Danger) 
on Danish railways 
• Relatively simple task (move train from station to station within the limits 
communicated to the train driver through track-side signals and signs) 
SPs 
Riskseminar, 
Lund 
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Model concepts – 3 submodels 
• Movement of the train: speed & 
position in response to position of 
controls (speed and brake). Includes 
generation of data on control panel 
(speedometer) 
 
• Environment: side track objects, 
external visual objects and audio 
inputs, depending on the position of 
the train and other events 
 
• A cognitive model of a train driver  
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Model Human Processor (Card et al.) 
• µ: storage capacity (items, ”chunks”) 
• δ: decay time of an item 
• κ: main code type (physical, acoustic, 
visual, semantic) 
• τ: cycle time 
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Model structure using DES with queues 
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Train driver control model 
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Info on: 
strategy, current 
tactic, location, 
speed, state of 
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24 
25. November 2014 DTU Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark 
    
     
   
Example of tactic: braking to stop before 
signal 
At each dot, the driver evaluates the braking rate by observing speed and 
distance to signal 
SPs 
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Concluding remarks 
• Discrete Event Simulation modelling has proven viability for the 
risk analysis of different safety critical systems. 
• It works and can produces a great deal of informative output 
and, in particular, probabilistic risk measures. 
– Fault trees, Event trees and safety barrier diagrams are 
rather easily modeled and simulated by DES environments.  
• The model may also predict rare events that may occur during 
the lifetime of an installation, but on the cost of the simulation 
run time  -> drawback compared with analytical calculations 
• The quality of safety barriers may depend on  
– procedures and maintenance standards  
– the educational level of the personal.  
Within the DES environment, it is possible to include human 
operations.  
Technical focused risk assessments can directly take human 
factors and performance into account. 
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Concluding remarks 
• The application of DES modeling in connection with risk analysis 
for which dynamic characteristics of the modeled processes 
cannot be neglected.  
• Hereunder the advantages compared to conventional models 
used in risk management are shown.  
– This enables to make better predictions for dynamical 
situations (variations in input parameters).  
– Such models provide more detailed answers to questions  
– Models retain geographical dependencies and time patterns.  
•  The approach is highly applicable in other areas e.g. fire safety 
management 
 
 
SPs Riskseminar, Lund 27 
25. November 2014 DTU Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark 
    
     
   
Thank you for your 
 interest  
 
 
fram@dtu.dk 
28 SPs Riskseminar, Lund 
